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SUMMARY 
The success of economic reform in Eastern European countries depends significantly on their capacity to 
attract an increasing inflow of private foreign capital. In most cases, domestic saving and Western official 
assistance alone will be insufficient to finance the huge investment effort necessary to move from a centrally-
planned system to a private market economy. Unfortunately, however, net voluntary private flows into 
transition economies fell in 1990 and 1991, and, while they have recovered quite strongly since 1992, their 
growth has been very concentrated in a few, mostly Central European, countries. 
• If arrears, debt restructurings and publicly-
guaranteed lending are excluded, commercial 
banks have been consistently reducing their 
exposure into Eastern Europe since 1990. 
• In a number of CEECs (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), the 
continuing reduction of international banks' 
new lending has been more than offset since 
1992 by a growing inflow of other forms of 
private finance, including FDI, issues of 
international bonds and portfolio investment. 
• In other transition countries, however, volun-
tary, non-guaranteed private flows remain 
very modest. In Russia, in particular.foreign 
private financing has largely consisted in the 
accumulation of arrears, deferrals, restruc-
turings and publicly-guaranteed credits. 
Furthermore, both Russia and other NIS are 
suffering from a serious capital flight prob-
lem that is to a large extent unrecorded in the 
statistics on private capital movements. 
• The main conditions for larger inflows of 
private capital into the region are political 
and macro-economic stability, progress in 
structural reform and, in some cases, an 
adequate treatment of the inherited foreign 
debt burden. 
• By insisting on macro-economic stabilization 
and structural reform, the economic policy 
programmes supported by the [MF/World 
Bank and the EC/G-24 have aimed at 
removing some of the major obstacles to a 
higher inflow of private capital into the 
transition countries. The EC/G-24 macro-
financial assistance is intended to be pro-
gressively discontinued as the current ac-
counts of the recipient countries strengthen 
and private capital inflows increase. The 
conditionality incorporated into the program-
mes should, therefore, increasingly focus on 
those aspects of structural reform that are 
directly relevant for attracting private ca-
pital. 
• In those countries where the service of the 
foreign debt imposes an unacceptable cost in 
terms of a compression of imports and 
economic growth, and which have already 
accumulated arrears or been forced to 
reschedule in the past, the debt burden 
represents a major obstacle for their access to 
international private finance. For those 
countries, EC/G-24 macro-financial assist-
ance should support, where appropriate, debt 
restructuring and debt reduction operations, 
provided they are accompanied by com-
prehensive adjustment and reform program-
mes agreed with the !MF. By contrast, 
countries with high foreign debt but which 
have not incurred in the past the credibility 
cost of running arreas or restructuring, and 
which can manage to "grow out" of their 
debts, stand a better chance of increasing 
their inflows of private capital by continuing 
to fully service them. 
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RECENT TRENDS IN PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS 
TO CEECs AND NIS 
1. Overall trends 
• Until the late 1980s private international financial flows 
to Eastern Europe largely consisted in lending from 
international commercial banks and suppliers' credits. 
Both international bank lending and total private flows 
to those countries expanded considerably in the second 
half of the 1980s. In 1990 and 1991, however, 
voluntary (1 ), non-publicly-guaranteed private capital 
flows into transition economies recorded a distinct 
contraction (see table 1). While foreign direct invest-
ment (FOi) and gross issues of international bonds 
expanded significantly in those years, this did not 
compensate the sharp decrease in banks' voluntary and 
non-guaranteed exposure into the area (see section 2). 
In 1992 and 1993, international banks have continued 
to reduce their voluntary and unguaranteed leading to 
CEECs and N IS but this has been more than off set by a 
quite important increase in other forms of private 
capital inflows. Furthermore, a considerable part of the 
increase in private inflows has been in the form of FOi 
and, to a lesser extent, portfolio equity investment. 
Thus, transition economies seem to be finally benefiting 
to some degree from the increase in non-debt-creating 
private capital inflows that many developing countries 
(LDC's) (2) have been enjoying since 1990. 
• These overall trends, however, hide important dif-
ferences between the CEECs and the NIS, as well as 
among countries belonging to each of these two areas. 
The growth of voluntary and non-guaranteed private 
financial flows into the transition economies has up to 
now been very concentrated in a few Central European 
countries and the Baltic States ( CEECs), with Hungary 
and the Czech Republic accounting for the bulk of it. It 
is worth noting here that, whereas official disburse-
ments for most transition countries fell in the period 
1991-92 significantly short of the amounts projected in 
the programmes agreed with the IMF, private 
(1) That is, excluding arrears and debt restructurings. 
(2) Excluding transition countries. 
medium- and long-term capital inflows received by 
CEECs were in general larger than initially envisaged 
(see table 2). 
TABLE 2: Programmed and actual external financing for CEEC's in 
1991-92(1)(2) (in billions of US dollars) 
Original 
IMF 
programme Actual 
Official lending 17.8 9.4 
IMF 6.2 4.7 
World Bank 3.5 2.2 
Other multilateral institutions I. I 0.4 
G-24 7 2,1 
Private capital 8.3 10 
Other(3) I0.6 9.9 
Total financing 36.4 29.6 
Memorandum items 
Current account -15.3 -5.9 
Change in reserves -6.1 -9 
(- = increase) 
Source: ·Official Financing for Developing Countries', IMF, August 1993. 
(l) Gross disbursements. 
Actual as a 
percentage 
of original 
programme 
53 
76 
63 
36 
30 
120 
93 
81 
39 
148 
(2) Figures are based on IMF programme years: calendar years for Bulgaria, the former 
CSFR. Hungary, Poland and Romania, and the period July 1992-June 1993 for Albania 
and the Baltic states. Poland is not included in 1992, when no annual program was 
agreed. 
(') Mainly debt relief by private and official creditors for Bulgaria and Poland. 
By contrast, the flow of voluntary and unguaranteed 
private capital into the New Independent States ( NIS) 
has remained very small, both in relative terms (that is, 
as a percentage of GDP or in per capita terms) and in 
absolute terms. Much of the growth of private capital 
inflows seen by NIS since 1992 reflects the fact that 
international banks have been forced to increase their 
exposure on Russia through the accumulation of 
arrears, and through deferrals and reschedulings. Part 
ofit also reflects the extension of new commercial bank 
loans under public guarantees. More importantly, 
Russia and other NIS have been suffering since 1991 a 
very serious flight of private capital, most of which is 
not recorded in the statistics on private capital flows. 
Thus, taking the item "errors and omissions" of the 
balance of payments as a rough approximation for 
illegal capital, total capital flight from Russia (both 
illegal and through legal channels) is estimated to have 
amounted to almost US$ 10 bn in the first 9 months of 
1993. 
TABLE I: Net private capital inflows into CEEC's and NIS( 1) (in millions of US dollars) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
Net unguarenteed bank lending -159 526 4.003 5.274 
Other net private loans (2) 838 3.604 -2.512 - 1.791 
Net issues of international bonds 347 567 1.218 2.159 
Issues of international equity 
Net foreign direct investment -12 19 37 277 
Net portofolio investment 
Increase in arrears on private loans 1.361 1.584 -1.930 
Interest arrears -245 486 197 
Principal arrears 1.606 1.098 -2.127 
Debt restrueturings on private debt 2.472 1.544 1.073 2.522 
Principal rescheduled 2.267 1.544 1.065 2.365 
Interest rescheduled 205 8 157 
Principal forgiven 
Memorandum item: 
Net voluntary nonguaranteed private flows 176 1.111 5.258 7.710 
Sources. World Dcht Ta hies 1993/94 (World Bank), IMF, national balance of payments statistics and Commission estimates. 
C Preliminary estimates. 
(I) Excluding capital flight and other short-term capital movements. 
() Suppliers' credits and hank credits covered by a guarantee from an export credit agency. 
1990 1991 
-6.951 -5.185 
8.287 712 
1.765 1.441 
68 91 
727 2.568 
4.780 2.412 
4.737 1.646 
43 767 
1.332 558 
645 447 
170 104 
517 7 
-4.391 -1.085 
1992 
-1.752 
11.146 
914 
33 
4.618 
200 
5.181 
-933 
6.114 
3.197 
562 
635 
2.000 
4.013 
:993 e 
4.733 
10 
4.630 
1.300 
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2. International bank lending 
• Impressed by the adjustment undertaken by most the 
East Block countries during the first half of the 1980s 
and lacking attractive lending outlets, international 
banks expanded substantially their new credits to the 
CEECs (3) and, above all, the FSU between 1985 and 
1989. Thus, BIS reporting banks' (4) claims on Eastern 
Europe, corrected for the fluctuations of the dollar 
exchange rate (5), are estimated to have grown by about 
60% between end-1984 and end-1989, with the FSU 
accounting for 70% of the increase. 
• However, the serious deterioration of the economic and 
financial situation and the political upheavals seen in 
Eastern Europe since 1989-90 advised foreign banks to 
reduce their involvement in that area. As a result, BIS 
reporting banks' claims on transition countries fell by 
US$ 9 bn in 1990 and by a further US$ 1.5 bn in 1991 
(see table 3). In fact, the contraction of bank claims 
would have been even greater had there not been an 
accumulation of arrears by Poland, Bulgaria and the 
FS U. The drop in private bank lending was particularly 
intense in the FSU, where reporting banks' claims fell 
by US$ 4.9 bn between end-1989 and end-1991. This 
sudden loss of access to commercial bank finance 
obliged the FSU to run down sharply its deposits at BIS 
banks, which fell, on an exchange rate-adjusted basis, 
by US$ 6.3 bn between end-1989 and end-1991. 
• In 1992 and 1993 trends in international bank lending 
have been very different in the CEECs and the FSU. 
In the case of the CEECs, BIS reporting banks have 
continued to reduce their exposure quite rapidly. 
Reporting banks' claims on these countries fell by US$ 
2 bn in 1992 and by US$ 2.4 bn in the first three quarters 
of 1993. The decline in bank lending has been very 
pronounced in the case of Hungary, a country that, 
however, enjoys a relatively high degree of access to the 
international bond and equity markets. Between end-
1991 and September 1993, the reporting banks' asset 
position in Hungary fell by US$ 2.6 bn, after having 
already dropped by US$ 3.3 bn in the two previous 
years (6). 
(3) In this section, the term CEECs excludes the Baltic countries. 
( 4) BIS reporting banks include banks in the G-10, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Spain and in most of 
the well-known off-shore centers (the Bahamas, Hong-Kong, 
Bahrain, etc.). 
(5) Since a relatively high proportion of the BIS reporting banks' claims 
on Eastern European countries is denominated in currencies other 
than the dollar, the increase in the dollar value of total claims 
between 1984 and 1989 is exaggerated by the depreciation suffered 
by the US dollar during most of that period. For this reason, it is 
more relevant to look at exchange rate-adjusted changes in claims. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all mentions made hereafter to BIS 
reporting banks claims will refer to exchange rate-adjusted claims. 
( 6) However, it must be noted that most of the US$ 1.1 bn contraction in 
claims of Hungary recorded in Q3' 93 reflected the writing-off of 
previous claims on the CM EA that had been fictiously reclassified as 
claims on Hungary after the dismantling of the CMEA. 
By contrast, BIS reporting banks' claims on the FSU 
expanded sharply in 1992 (by US$ 5.9 bn) and again, 
although moderately, in the first three quarters of 1993 
(by US$ 0.4 bn). This basically reflects the increase in 
new officially-guaranteed trade credits (particularly 
from German banks), the accumulation of arrears on 
both interest and principal and the deferrals and 
restructurings granted by commercial banks (7). On the 
other hand, the strong capital flight from the FSU has 
been reflected since 1992 in a rapid rise of deposits held 
by FSU residents at BIS reporting banks (see table 3). 
• The increase in banks' claims on the FSU in 1992 amply 
offset the decrease in claims on the CEECs. As a result, 
total bank claims on transition economies increased by 
US$ 3.8 bn. In the first three quarters of 1993, by 
contrast, the increase in banks' exposure on the FSU 
was too small to prevent a US$ 2 bn reduction in their 
total claims on transition economies. 
• The gloomy picture just given about the recent 
evolution of new non-officially guaranteed bank 
lending to transition economies must be qualified with 
the two following observations: 
3) Western banks' direct lending to private enterprises 
seems to be rising in some Central European 
countries, in particular in the Czech Republic. This 
contrast with the continuing reduction of banks' 
claims on the official sectors of these countries. 
4) Foreign banks have continued to provide fresh 
lending in a very selective way to certain credit-
worthy borrowers, often using a variety of risk-
mitigating techniques, including cofinancing with 
international financial institutions and asset securiti-
zation. Thus, the Czech Republic established in 
February 1993 a US$ 200 million one-year revolving 
credit facility with a German bank, in order to 
strengthen its reserves. Also, in July 1993, Slovenia 
made its debut in the Euromarket with a US$ 100 
million three-year syndicated bank loan, the pro-
ceeds of which were used for balance of payments 
purposes. 
Examples of loans granted in 1993 that have used 
risk-reducing divices are: a US$ 20 million loan 
facility for the Republic of Georgia secured on oil 
tankers; a US$ 100 million revolving credit and 
medium-term loan facility established for Also VAZ, 
which made of the recently privatized car-maker the 
first Russian company to borrow internationally 
without official guarantee; and a Ft 32.5 bn (about 
US$ 375 mio) loan facility for a road transportation 
project in Hungary, secured by toll revenues and by 
the participation of the EBRD, which will bear a 
significant part of the project risk. 
(7) Bank creditors agreed in December 1991 to postpone repayments 
due in the following quarter, an agreement that would be renewed 
several times. In July 1993, the London Club accepted to reschedule 
repayments due in 1993 in exchange for a partial resumption of 
interest payments by Russia. By the end of 1993, however, Russia 
had still not made any interest payments. 
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TABLE 3 : Exchange rate-adjusted changes in BIS reporting banks external assets and liabilities vis-a-vis Eastern Europe 
(in millions of US dollars) 
1989 1990 
Albania 271 - 22 
Bulgaria 742 -461 
Former CSFR 619 -404 
Hungary 508 - 1.861 
Poland -631 2 
Romania - 474 21 
FSU 7.456 -6.240 
Residual 57 -120 
Total Eastern Europe 8.548 -9.085 
East. Europe excl. FSU 1.092 - 2.845 
LDC's (I) -13.907 -8.013 
Albania 165 - 98 
Bulgaria - 571 -62] 
Former CSFR 524 - 955 
Hungary -225 498 
Poland 240 3.496 
Romania 997 - 1.313 
reFSU - 686 - 6.599 
Residual 85 -200 
Total Eastern Europe 529 - 5.792 
East. Europe excl. FSU 1.215 807 
Source: BIS quarterly reports o n Interna tional Ba nking and Fina ncial Markets Developments. 
p = provisiona l. 
(') Excluding C EEC's and NIS . 
3. Foreign direct investment 
• Net inflows of FDI into trans1t10n economies have 
increased rapidly from practically zero in 1988 to an 
estimated US$ 4.6 bn in 1993 (see table 4). The growth 
of net FOi was particularly rapid in 1991 and 1992 but 
was interrupted in 1993. 
• The share of Eastern Europe in total FDI into non-
developed countries, which was close to zero before the 
beginning of the reforms, has risen considerably in 
recent years despite the strong growth in FDI to LDCs 
(see figure 1). At 8.2% in 1993, however, the share 
remains modest. 
• The growth in FOi has been very concentrated in a few 
countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic (8) alone 
account for about 50% of the total net inflow of FOi 
received by CEECs and NIS since 1990. Other 
significant recipients in terms of absolute values are 
Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
In per capita terms, Hungary ranks first with average 
annual net inflows of US$ 130 per head in the period 
1992-93, followed by the Czech Republic and Slovenia, 
both with net inflows per capita of around US$ 70, and 
Estonia with US$ 46. All other countries (including 
Poland) have per capita inflows of less than US$ 20. 
With a share of only 12% in the total net inflow of FDI 
received by the region since 1990 and a per capita net 
inflow of only US$ 5, Russia continues to be clearly 
underrepresented . FDI in most other NIS remains 
marginal with the exception of Ukraine and Kaz-
akhstan. 
(8) The Czech Republic is estimated to have received about 95% of the 
FDI that flowed into the former CSFR between 1990 and 1992. 
12 months 1993 
199 1 1992 up to 
Sept. 93 p . Ip II p Ill p 
ASSETS 
- 46 18 55 20 -I 19 
- 670 - 477 - 726 - 156 - 235 - 93 
-796 - 330 -536 -31 -150 -108 
- 1.440 - 1.557 - 1.643 202 - 183 - 1.072 
38 52 -1 .021 - 319 - 279 -160 
115 308 377 69 80 50 
1.313 5.883 380 - 360 757 34 
- 10 - 14 - 30 6 - 2 - 58 
-1.496 3.839 - 3.144 - 569 - 13 -1.388 
- 2.809 - 2.044 - 3.524 - 209 - 770 - 1.422 
9.224 55.276 12.400 5.000 400 -4.800 
LIABILITIES 
- 190 39 51 4 24 0 
438 444 10 -131 -65 119 
1.395 1.164 213 3 341 139 
1.885 -703 -1 .324 - 290 - 116 - 102 
- 2.528 2.675 376 - 1.044 217 -49 
- 16 185 172.172 73 20 65 
330 5.776 6.1 40 1.554 2.236 - 31 8 
- 2 129 - 3 - 52 - 24 -10 
1.312 9.709 5.635 117 2.633 - 156 
982 3.933 - 505 - 1.437 397 162 
• A breakdown by investor country of total FDI flows 
into transition economies is not available. Partial 
information for various individual countries, however, 
suggests that EC and EFT A countries account for 
between 50 and 75% of the cumulative inflows since 
1990. Germany and the USA are the two main 
providers of FOi flows. Japanese companies, by 
contrast, continue to show little interest in the region. 
Germany and Austria dominate investment into their 
neighbouring Central European countries. 
GRAPH I : Net FDI inflows into Eastern Europe 
% share or total inllows 11110 non-devdopcd countries 
12 .--------------------~ 
10 
6 
4 
2 
0.1 0.2 
0 
0. 1 
- 2 
1986 !9X7 19XX 1989 19</0 1991 19'12 1993 
Soura ; World Oehl Tables 1993/94, World Bank. 
• The stagnation of the net inflow of FOi seen in 1993 has 
occurred despite a significant growth of FOi in Poland, 
Estonia and Slovenia, and is basically explained by the 
reduction in inflows into Hungary and, in particular, 
the Czech Republic. In this last country, net FOi 
- 5 --
sharply fell from US$ 983 mio in 1992 to US$ 561 mio. enlarging productive capacity; 2) in some Central 
European countries, privatization has lost steam and 
the most profitable investment opportunities have 
already been exploited; 3) increased political instability 
in the NIS; 4) finally, in the case of the Czech Republic, 
FOi was negatively affected in the first quarter of 1993 
by the uncertainties surrounding the split of the CSFR. 
Net FOi inflows in other countries, however, also fell 
slightly or slowed down their growth. 
The interruption of FOi growth in 1993 could reflect 
the following factors: 1) recession or weak activity in 
some of the main investor countries (in particular, in 
Germany) have reduced their companies' need for 
TABLE 4: Foreign direct investment into transition economies 
Net inflows in million US dollars 
1990 1991 1992 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Albania 21 
Bulgaria 4 56 42 
Former CSFR 199 594 l.054 
Czech Republic 983 
Slovak Republic 71 
Hungary 337 1.459 1.471 
Poland 88 l 17 284 
Romania -18 37 73 
Former Yugoslavia 67 119 93 
of which: 
Croatia 16 
Slovenia -2 41 113 
Total ahove ( A) 677 2.382 3.038 
Former Soviet Union (8) 100 186 1.580 
o/'ll'hich: 
58 Estonia 
Latvia 43 
Lithuania 10 
Kazakhstan 200 
Russia 100 700 
Ukraine 200 
Uzbekistan 100 
Total transition countries (A+ 8) 727 2.568 4.618 
Annual per capita Number of registered joint-ventures (2) 
net inflow 
1993( 1) (average 1992/ 1993) 1990 1991 1992 1993(3) 
22 6 1.200 1.300 
44 5 140 900 1.200 1.200 
1.600 4.000 5.995 
561 75 3.120 3.700 
100 16 2.875 3.948 
1.200 130 5.693 9.ll7 13.218 15.311 
580 II 2.799 4.796 5.740 6.300 
50 3 1.50.l 8.022 20.684 26.249 
36 5 
140 70 l.000 2.815 3.050 
2.733 23 
1.897 6 2.905 3.920 15.290 20.290 
86 46 1.100 2.662 4.052 
50 18 295 2.621 2.700 
40 7 220 2.000 2.638 
300 15 540 
666 5 2.022 3.252 5.249 
225 4 400 2.000 2.400 
100 5 570 
4.630 11 
Sources: World Debt Tables (World Bank), UN Economic Commission for Europe, national balance of payments statistics and Commission estimates. 
(I) For many countries, preliminary estimates. . . . . . .. 
(2) Data from the UN Economic Commis~ion for Europe's joint venture database. The high figures reported by Romania probably reflect a methodolog1cal problem m the stattsttcal defimt10ns 
used by this country. 
(1) Figures as of July 1993. 
4. Access to the international bond and equity markets 
• The total volume of funds raised by the transition 
economies in the international bond and equity markets 
increased steadily between 1989 and 1992 and rose 
sharply in 1993 (see table 5). Most of the funds raised in 
these markets was in the form of international bonds, 
with issues of international shares remaining insignific-
ant and even declining in 1992 and 1993. 
• Only five transition economies (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria) have so far 
been able to tap the international bond and equity 
markets. In fact, Hungary alone accounts for 83% ofall 
international bonds issued by transition economies 
since 1989 and it is practically the only transition 
country that has been active in the market for 
international equity issues. The only other Eastern 
European countries that have been present to a 
significant extent in the international bond market are 
the former CSFR and its successor republics. 
• Hungary and the Czech Republic are the only transition 
economies that have been assigned a rating by the two 
leading international rating agencies (Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's). In March 1993, Moody's 
upgraded to an investment mark the Czech Republic's 
rating (from the Bal previously assigned to the CSFR 
to Baa3) and Standard and Poor's has issued to the 
Czech Republic a comparable BBB rating. Hungary's 
rating, by contrast, is still one notch below investment 
grade (Bal by Moody's and BB+ by Standard & 
Poor's). 
• Having grown from US$ 1 bn in 1989 to US$ 1.4 bn in 
1992, total issues of international bonds by transition 
countries increased four-fold in 1993. This was led by 
the spectacular expansion in borrowing by the National 
Bank of Hungary (NBH), which raised US$ 4.5 bn 
taking advantage of favourable market conditions. The 
Czech National Bank (CNB), for its part, launched its 
debut issue in April 1993, a US$ 375 mio 3-year 
Eurobond, to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves after 
the speculation that accompanied the dissolution of the 
CSFR. Then, in August, the CNB placed a yen 35 bn 
(about US$ 290 bn) bond in the Samurai market. The 
rapid growth of portfolio and other private inflows 
received by the Czech Republic after the third quarter 
of 1993 advised the CNB to cancel a third international 
bond issue that was initially planned for the end of last 
year. Finally, the National Bank of Slovakia issued in 
September 1993 a US$ 240 mio international bond. 
In January 1994, Calex, a Slovak state-owned manu-
facturing company, placed a US$ 21 mio 3-year 
Eurobond carrying a guarantee from the Slovak 
government. With the NBH currently targeting a total 
issue volume of US$ 2 bn in 1994 (9), Hungary is likely 
to remain the most active East European issuer of 
international bonds in the foreseeable future. Given the 
surge in private capital flows into the Czech Republic 
(9) Of this amount, US$ I bn has already been issued in the first two 
months of the year. 
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and the country's comfortable current account po-
sition, the CNB is unlikely to launch additional issues 
years behind the impressive expansion of issues by the 
LDCs as a whole. Thus, despite the sharp increase in 
issuance activity by CEEC's in 1993, the share of 
transition countries in the total volume of international 
bonds launched by developing and transition countries 
in 1993 was, at 9.8%, still far below the 20.5% share 
seen in 1990. 
this year. Some major Czech companies, however, are 
expected to tap the international capital markets in the 
coming months. 
• While significant, the growth of international bonds 
issued by transition economies has lagged in recent 
TABLE 5: International bond and equity issues (in millions of US dollars) 
1989 1990 199 1 
International bond issues 
Eastern Europe 981 1.263 1.463 
Czech Republic 
Former CSFR 375 277 
Hungary 879 888 1.186 
Slovak Republik 
LDC's + Eastern Europe 5.487 6.164 12.428 
% share of East, Europe over total of LDC's 
+ Eastern Europe 17.9 20.5 11.8 
International equity issues 
Eastern Europe n.a . 68 91 
Hungary n.a. 68 91 
Poland 
LDC's + Eastern Europe n.a. 1.262 5.436 
% share of East Europe over total of LDC's 
+ Eastern Europe n.a . 5.4 1.7 
Source : ' Priva te Market Financing fo r Developing Countries' , IMF, February 1994. 
1992 1993 
1.370 5.733 
697 
129 
1.242 4.796 
240 
23.526 58.599 
5.8 9.8 
33 10 
33 9 
I 
9.259 I 1.482 
0.4 0.2 
II 
1.257 
279 
11.764 
8 
7 
I 
3.179 
1993 
Ill IV 
1.988 3.530 
322 
1.280 1.873 
240 
13.272 23.609 
9 
2.351 5.312 
GRAPH 2 : Net inflows of FDI received by transition economies between 1990 and 1993 
Czech and Slovak Rep. 
19.9% 
Other CEEC's (I) 
14.7% 
Hungary 
35.4% 
Other FSU 
8.6% 
Russia 11.6% 
4.0% 
/1) Excluding the Baltic countries but including the republics of the former Yugoslavia. 
Sauret'.,: .World Debt Tables (World Bank), UN Economic Commission for Europe, national balance of payments ligurcs and Commission estimates. 
5. Portfolio investment 
• The term portfolio investment covers here the purchase 
by non-residents of long- and short-term bonds and 
corporate equities, other than those included in FOi or 
issued by transition countries in the international 
capital markets. 
• The lack of reliable data makes the measurement of 
recent trends in portfolio investment to CEECs and 
NIS a very difficult task. Since there is at present no 
international organisation systematically collecting 
comparable statistics on portfolio flows, data have to be 
obtained from disperse, uncomplete and often incon-
sistent sources. Furthermore, national balance of 
payments statistics very seldom distinguish portfolio 
flows from other capital movements. However, some 
national balance of payments figures, the boom seen in 
the stock markets of several CEECs since the second 
half of 1993 and the growing presence of foreign 
investors in certain domestic bond markets suggest a 
significant increase of portfolio investment flows into 
the region, although, again, concentrated in a limited 
number of countries. 
• The emergent stock markets of Budapest, Prague and 
Warsaw have been experiencing sustained rallies since 
the third or fourth quarter of 1993 (see graph 2). In 
dollar terms, their respective market indices closed the 
year, respectively, 29%, 96% and 787% higher 
than at the beginning of the year(IO). The Warsaw 
Stock Exchange was by far the best performing stock 
market in the world in 1993. 
In all three cases, foreign investors have been an 
important force behind the rallies. Thus, for example, 
foreign buyers are estimated to account for about 25% 
of the average daily turnover of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange and own about 20% of its market capitalis-
ation . International institutional investors, in par-
ticular, are becoming increasingly involved in these 
markets. Several investment funds targeting totally or 
partially stocks of listed Central and Eastern European 
companies have been created. In February 1994, CS 
First Boston launched a US$ 200 million investment 
fund for purchasing shares in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Prague. This amounts to about I% of the 
combined market capitalization of the Budapest, 
Prague and Warsaw Stock Exchanges. 
Both the indices and the degree of foreign involvement 
in the Hungarian, Czech and Polish stock exchanges 
may suffer a correction from the relatively high present 
levels. But, beyond this possible short-term reaction, 
foreign investors' interest in these and other Central 
and Eastern European stock exchanges should con-
tinue to grow as the privatization process proceeds, the 
number of listed companies increases, the markets 
become more liquid and the quality of the financial 
statements and other information disclosed by com-
pames improves. 
• Foreign investors are also beginning to show some 
interest in the government securities markers of some 
CEECs. This is being supported by the progressive 
liberalization in several countries of the regulations 
affecting the purchase of government securities and the 
repatriation of investment income by foreigners. 
• Poland and Hungary are removing the restrictions on 
the participation of foreigners in the Treasury markets 
in order to find new sources with which to finance their 
high budget and current account deficits . Thus, in July 
1993, Poland allowed foreigners to invest in one-year T-
bonds and to repatriate freely principal, interest and 
capital gains from investments in government secu-
rities. Until then, foreigners had only been permitted to 
invest in 3-year T-bonds and in 26-,39- and 52-week T-
bills, and had to obtain special authorizations whenever 
they wished to repatriate profits. In October 1993, 
Poland allowed foreigners to invest also in 13-week T-
bills. 
Hungary, for its part, is planning to increase the access 
of foreigners to the forint-denominated domestic 
government bonds by issuing on a regular basis 
(perhaps every two months) bonds that foreign 
investors will be able to buy and trade in the domestic 
secondary market. In the past, only one domestic state 
bond issue (at the end of 1992) has been open to 
foreigners, which means that foreigners wanting 
( 10) The Prague Stock Exchange started operating only in April of last 
yea r. 
7 
to invest in Hungarian treasuries have had to do it 
basically through the purchase of participations in 
Budapest-based investment funds. These are close-
ended funds targeting Hungarian government securities 
which may sell, with the permission of the National 
Bank of Hungary, between 20 and 40% of their shares 
to foreign investors. Since Creditanstalt set up in March 
1992 the "CA Securities Hungarian Government Debt 
Fund", several of these funds have been created. 
GRAPH 3: Central European Stock Market Indices (1) 
WARSAW STOCK EXCHANGE (US$: end 1992 = 100) 
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1993 1994 
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PRAGUE STOCK EXCHANGE 
(HN-WOOD 30 Index : Sep 7, 1993 = 1000: Ctcch crowns) 
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( ' ) The shaded area rcnect, the evoluuon or the IFC Composite Index, which covers 1250 
~uritic, from 22 l!mc:rg1ng :-.lock markets. The black line reflects the evolution of an indeJ1. 
of 1he relevant market. 
Smirn•., lnternattonal l'inanc1al Co rporauon (IFC) Emerging Markets Database and 
Plantcom. 
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In the Czech Republic, the Foreign Exchange Act 
restricts repatriation of income on investments of less 
than one year of original maturity, which in principle 
precludes foreign investment in T-bills. However, the 
Czech Republic has signed Foreign Investor Protection 
Treaties with about thirty countries, which supersede 
the Act and allow repatriation of all forms of foreign 
investment. Twenty of these Treaties have already 
entered into force. Furthermore, the restrictions 
contained in the Foreign Exchange Act may eventually 
be abolished as part of the Czech plan to gradually 
introduce capital account convertibility. 
• Foreign investors have also been active recently in the 
corporate bond markets of some CEECs, especially in 
Hungary and in the Czech Republic. Much of it has 
been through the participation in "private placements" 
of forint-denominated bonds issued either by the local 
subsidiaries of multinationals or by state-owned 
companies and banks. 
• In most other transition countries, however, fixed 
income portfolio inflows remain very limited. In many 
cases the government bond markets are very under-
developed and illiquid, with the fiscal deficits being 
financed mainly through the banking system. Cor-
porate bond markets, for their part, are usually either 
inexistent or too risky for foreign investors. Even when 
incipient markets exist, foreign exchange and other 
regulations often prevent foreigners from participating 
in them. Other factors discouraging foreign investors 
are the exchange rate and transfer risk associated with 
macroeconomic and political instability and the lack of 
appropriate settlement and custody infrastructures. 
6. Conditions for a larger inflow of private capital into 
CEECs and NIS 
• By reducing the risks associated with investing in those 
countries, increased political and macro-economic 
stability would encourage all types of flows. In 
particular, to the extent that it is reflected in the 
assignment of a favourable mark by the major 
international rating agencies, it may have an important 
positive effect on the degree of access to the inter-
national capital markets and on the amount of foreign 
portfolio investment received by the country. A country 
with an investment grade rating, like the Czech 
Republic, not only will be able to raise funds in the 
international bond markets at low spreads but will 
become eligible for portfolio investment by major 
international institutional investors, many of which are 
constrained either by internal rules or by national 
regulations to investment grade securities. Macro-
economic stability may also facilitate the removal of 
some of the exchange controls hindering portfolio 
inflows and, like the recent experience of several Latin 
American countries shows, may stimulate the repatri-
ation of flight capital. 
• Progress in structural reform can also stimulate foreign 
investment. Privatization increases the opportunities 
for FOi and equity portfolio investment. Also, 
improving the definition of property rights, establishing 
a proper legal and contractual environment for foreign 
business, creating efficient banking and payments 
systems and modernizing the transport and telecom-
munications infrastructures is essential for attracting 
higher inflows of FOi. Developing well-functioning 
domestic stock, bond and money markets can widen the 
range of instruments in which foreigners can invest. 
This is particularly important in the case of foreign 
institutional investors, which are managing an increas-
ing share of the industrial countries' savings and which 
can normally only undertake portfolio investments. 
Also, success in systemic transformation will strengthen 
the credibility of the government, will improve the 
image of the country and will, therefore, reduce the 
perceived risk associated with investing in it. 
• Finally, it is clear that, other things being constant, the 
higher the.foreign debt, the more risk the country will be 
perceived to be and the lower the inflow of private 
capital will be. Less clear, however, are the implications 
of debt forgiveness and debt reschedulings for private 
capital inflows. On the one hand, it may be argued that 
if a country restructures the debt it will lose credibility 
and access to the international capital markets, and will 
experience a slowdown in other capital inflows 
(including FOi). This is the argument behind the 
Hungarian strategy of continuing to service its debt and 
a possible explanation for the much lower inflow of 
private finance received by Poland as compared to 
Hungary. On the other hand, it may be argued that a 
successful debt reduction and restructuring package 
may, by alleviating the external debt burden, reduce the 
risk attached by foreigners to investing in the country 
and increase private inflows. An example of this would 
be the Mexican experience following the Brady-style 
debt reduction at the end of the 1980s. 
There may be some truth in both types of arguments. A 
country which is perceived can manage to "grow out" of 
its foreign debt (because its debt burden is not 
excessively high and/or because its GDP and export 
growth prospects are good enough), and which has not 
already incurred in the past the credibility cost of 
running arrears or restructuring the debt, probably 
stands a better chance of increasing the inflow of private 
capital by continuing to fully and duly service its debt. 
By contrast, for a country whose foreign debt burden is 
perceived to impose an unacceptable cost in terms of a 
compression of imports and economic growth and/or 
which has already accumulated arrears or been forced 
to reschedule in the past (II), a comprehensive debt 
reduction and restructuring package (12) may be its best 
(and, perhaps, its only) way to gain access to private 
finance. For this second strategy to work, however, the 
restructuring should be quick and should be seen as 
complete and definitive: protracted debt negotiations 
can have a negative impact on private capital inflows 
and may even cause capital flight. It should also be 
accompanied by macro-economic and structural ad-
justment programmes supported by the international 
financial community. 
( 11 ) A country whose credibility as a debtor has already been damaged 
by past arrears or debt rcstructurings has not much more credibility 
to lose by restructuring again. 
( 12) Affecting its commercial debt. its official debt. or both. 
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7. Implications for EC/G-24 macro-financial assistance 
to transition countries 
• If we exclude the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Estonia and Latvia, and we deduct from the change in 
international bank lending the part that reflects new 
arrears, deferrals, reschedulings and officially-guaran-
teed credits, private capital inflows into transition 
economies have remained relatively modest. Further-
more, in most countries the balance of payments 
situation will continue to impose a serious constraint on 
economic growth in the coming years. This is true even 
for Hungary, the major beneficiary country in recent 
years of the increase in private capital flows into the 
area. In Poland, for example, domestic demand growth 
may decelerate this year reflecting the country's 
inability to finance a higher current account deficit. 
More significantly, capital flight, high debt service 
obligations, low spontaneous private inflows and the 
need to rebuild the foreign exchange reserve positions 
are obliging Russia and several NIS to run substantial 
surpluses in their trade and non-factor services 
accounts, at the cost of a sharp compression of imports, 
domestic investment and economic growth. 
• EC/G-24 official macro-financial assistance to CEECs 
is intended to be progressively replaced by private 
financial flows. By insisting on macro-economic 
stabilization and structural reform, the economic policy 
programmes supported by the IMF/World Bank and 
the EC/G-24 have implicitly aimed at removing some of 
the major obstacles to a higher inflow of private capital 
into the transition countries. Furthermore, the con-
ditionality associated with past EC/G-24 macro-
financial assistance has normally included some 
structural adjustment criteria which were explicitly 
designed to encourage private capital inflows. 
There is, however, some extra room for increasing the 
focus of the conditionality incorporated into the 
programmes on those aspects of structural reform that 
are directly relevant for attracting private capital. These 
may include, for example, financial sector reform (and, 
in particular, the development of domestic capital 
markets), the adoption of tax and foreign exchange 
regulations that will encourage foreign investment, the 
improvement in accounting and disclosure standards 
for enterprises, the signature of Foreign Investment 
Protection Treaties affecting not only FOi but also 
other private flows, or the modernization of the 
transport and telecommunications infrastructures. 
• For those countries where a high foreign debt burden 
remains a major obstacle to their access to international 
private finance, that is, those countries where the 
service of the foreign debt imposes an unacceptable cost 
in terms of reduced imports and economic growth and 
which have already incurred in the past the credibility 
cost of accumulating arrears or restructuring the debt, 
EC/G-24 macro-financial assistance should support 
debt restructuring and debt reduction operations, 
provided they are accompanied by the appropriate 
programmes agreed with the IMF. In this respect, the 
EC/G-24 support that will be provided in the case of 
Bulgaria and, possibly, Poland, to allow inter alia for 
the successful implementation of DDSR agreements 
with their commercial creditors, would be two import-
ant steps in the right direction. 
20 april 1994 
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TABLE A.I: Industrial production (a) - Percentage change on preceding period (s.a.) 
1992 1993 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 --- --- over 12 
IV I II III IV July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. months 
(b) 
B 3A 4.4 -2.0 0.0 -5.3 -2.2 -1.8 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 0.6 1.0 -1.5 2.6 -5.1 2.6 : -0.1 
DK 2.4 0.5 2.2 1.6 -2.8 --6.2 -1.0 -2.3 6.0 -0.7 -3.2 0.0 7.l -6.8 2.8 0.4 0.9 
WD 5.2 5.0 3.1 -1.0 -7.8 -2.9 -3.8 -1.0 0.0 --0.3 --0.7 2.7 -2.4 --0.4 0.4 1.7 --0.7 -4.7 
GR 1.5 -l.9 -1.5 -1.0 -2.8 -l.9 -2.6 2.8 1.0 -l. l -4.9 I.I 3.7 -3.6 0.0 -0.8 0.4 2.l 
E 4.5 0.1 --0.8 -2.8 -4.6 -4.4 -2.1 0.5 1.9 1.4 00.2 2.1 --0.4 -2.7 2.3 6.4 -7.9 3.4 
F 4.1 1.9 0.0 -I.I -4.2 -l.2 --0.5 -1.2 --0.1 0.4 0.6 --0.9 0.2 0.5 1.3 0.5 1.7 O.l 
IRL 11.5 4.7 3.3 9.2 
-2.6 
--0.7 4.4 -1.4 1.5 5.6 1.5 -1.0 1.5 
---0.4 
2.2 
I 3.9 --0.7 -2.1 -1.5 -l. l 0.6 --0.5 --0.6 0.5 0.9 1.7 l.4 0.9 -1.3 2.2 
L 7.9 --0.5 0.5 --0.9 -3.1 0.8 -2.2 3.1 --6.3 2.1 -0.9 -15.3 15.7 1.6 -5.7 1.4 3. 7 0.9 NL 4.2 2.0 2.8 --0.2 --0.9 -2.1 l.8 -1.2 1.5 -2.1 0.9 --0.9 2.7 -2.6 0.9 -4.4 0.0 p 6.8 9.0 -0.l -2.2 0.1 -0.5 -3.3 I.I 1.4 3.6 -3.9 -5.2 4.7 
--0.6 
-5.2 
UK 2.1 -0.3 -3.9 -0.5 2.6 0.6 O.l 0.8 I.I 1.0 l.3 -0.t O.l l.0 0.4 0.6 3.9 
EUR 12 4.0 1.9 -0.2 -0.9 (-3.3) -2.0 -0.9 -0.5 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 0.5 0.1 -0.4 (0.5) (0.3) (1.2) 
USA 1.5 0.0 -l.9 2.4 4.2 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 l.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.8 l.O 0.4 4.7 
JAP 4.9 4.2 1.8 -5.7 -4.2 -2.6 0.6 -1.6 -0.1 -3.3 --0.5 --0.9 2.1 -5.2 2.3 -1.6 l.O -2.6 
TABLE A.2: Unemployment rate (f) - Number of unemployed as percentage of civilian labour force (s.a.) 
1992 1993 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 --- over 12 
IV I II III IV Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. months 
(c) 
B 8.6 7.6 7.5 8.2 9.4 8.5 8.9 9.3 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.8 9.9 9.9 1.0 
DK 7.7 8.l 8.9 9.5 10.4 9.8 10.0 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.3 0.2 
WD 5.6 4.8 4.2 .5 5.6 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.0 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.1 1.0 
GR 7.4 7.2 7.7 7.7 
2i.5 20.7 22.3 22.l 22.4 E 17.1 16.2 16.4 18.2 19.5 21.5 21.6 21.4 21.8 22.6 22.9 22.9 2.2 
F 9.4 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.8 10.2 10.4 10.7 11.0 11.2 l l.0 11.0 l l.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 0.8 
IRL 15.7 14.5 16.2 17.8 18.4 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.2 18.4 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.3 18.4 18.1 18.0 -0.4 
I 10.9 10.0 JO.I 10.3 I I.I 10.5 10.8 11.3 l l. l 11.3 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.2 11.2 0.4 
L 1.8 l. 7 1.6 1.9 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 I.I 
NL 8.5 7.5 7.1 7.2 8.8 7.6 8.2 8.5 9.0 9.7 8.9 9.3 9.5 9.5 10.0 10.2 2.2 p 5.0 4.6 4.0 3.9 5.0 4.2 4.7 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.9 1.3 
UK 7.1 7.0 8.9 10.2 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.4 10.6 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.3 10.2 -0.2 
EUR 12 8.9 8.3 8.7 9.4 (10.5) 9.8 10.1 10.5 10.6 (10.8) 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.8 (10.8) (10.9) (0.9) 
USA(g) 5.3 5.5 6.7 7.4 6.8 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.5 6 7 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.7 6.5 -0.5 
JAP(g) 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.9 0.5 
TABLE A.3: Consumer price index - Percentage change on preceding period 
1993 1994 1993 1994 Change 
1989 I990 1991 1992 1993 --- over 12 
I II III IV I Sept. Oct. '.'Jov. Dec. Jan. Febr. March months 
(%)(b) 
B 3.1 3.4 3.2 2.4 2.8 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 2.3 
DK 4.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 --0.2 00 0.4 0.1 1.7 
WD 2.8 2.7 3.5 4.0 4.1 I.7 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 3.2 
GR 13.7 20.4 19.5 15.9 14.4 2.7 4.4 0.0 4.6 1.3 2.5 1.9 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.2 2.9 10.2 
E 6.8 6.7 6.0 5.9 4.6 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.3 4.9 
F 3.6 3.4 3.2 2.4 2.1 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 (0 2) (1.5) 
IRL(h) 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 1.4 0.4 --0.2 1.0 0.3 0.6 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2~ 
~0.2l 1.7 I 6.2 6.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.0 I. I 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 (0.6 0.4 (0 2) (4.3) 
L 3.4 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.6 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 2.3 
NL I. I 2.4 3.9 3.2 2.6 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 --0.5 0.4 0.5 (0.6) (2.9) p 12.7 13.2 10.9 9.0 6.4 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 6.0 
UK 7.8 9.5 5.9 3.7 1.6 0.7 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0. I 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 2.3 
EUR 12 5.1 5.7 5.0 4.2 3.4 0.9 J.l 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (3.2) 
USA 4.8 5.4 4.2 3.0 3.0 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.5 
JAP 2.3 3.1 3.3 1.7 1.3 0.0 0.9 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.1 --0.l -0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 I. I 
TABLE A.4: Visible trade balance - fob/cif, million ECU (s.a.) 
1991 1992 1992 Change 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992--- over 12 
IV I II Ill IV June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec months 
(d) 
it -2543 -2107 -5655 -7295 -6746 -1970 -2480 -1472 -1354 -1432 -366 571 -413 -370 -257 -439 736 23 925 1225 1951 2318 4062 674 779 901 1043 1306 412 331 377 355 554 496 256 3 g~) 60935 64055 44036 9245 15262 3241 2477 3055 5961 4152 628 809 2682 2470 2577 1234 341 -1271 
-5825 -7783 -9228 -10342 -10609 -3387 -2391 -3076 -2596 -2635 1063 929 -755 -912 873 506 -1256 -194 
E -11974 -19802 -19232 -21285 -21714 -5624 --6014 -5617 -5912 -4611 -1845 -2274 -1947 -1691 1423 -1347 -1841 -38 
F -11855 -13986 -17275 -13811 -6835 -2083 -1770 -1125 -1781 -1500 923 -346 -689 -746 -873 398 -229 1187 
IRL 2741 3049 2505 · 2701 5025 890 1228 1356 1247 1339 377 435 456 356 477 448 414 174 
I 8388 -11098 -9273 -10439 8193 -2311 -2219 3318 -1519 -1160 1226 786 47 -686 175 513 472 -415 
NL 1296 2895 -329 -2913 -1810 -715 -514 24 -210 -859 -136 -91 -187 68 87 -311 --635 -98 p 3473 -5033 -6239 -7492 8853 -1922 -1897 2081 -2308 -2435 646 592 -924 792 704 818 913 -209 
UK -42384 -41826 -30906 -22327 -26888 -4974 -6375 --6643 --7054 -7144 -2010 -2117 2751 -2186 -1815 -2613 -2716 -1293 
EUR 12G) -20548 -30416 49647 -81642 -67296 -18108 -18705 -17933 -14534 15116 6500 -6079 -4159 4296 2389 4874 --7853 -2158 
USA -100208 --99430 -79511 -53455 -63871 -13174 -11858 -16945 -17662 -17406 -5255 -5477 -6195 -5990 -5458 --6326 -5622 -873 
JAP 65441 58691 41167 62943 82222 17862 20545 20148 18862 22667 6002 6275 5968 6619 7858 7155 7655 1541 
TABLE A.5: Money stock (k) - Percentage change on preceding period (s.a.) 
1992 1993 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 --- over 12 
IV I II Ill IV Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. months 
(e) 
B M3H) 13.3 4.5 5.8 6.5 --0.1 
4.7 :i.o 5.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 -i.8 DK M2l 6.1 7.1 0.6 --0.7 14.6 -2.0 0.8 2.2 5.9 0.3 17.7 g~) M3 5.5 4.2 6.3 7.6 10.9 1.6 1.2 2.8 1.5 3.0 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.5 2.0 (0.8? p l.9l M3 24.2 15.3 12.3 14.4 15.2 3.1 1.0 4.3 3.7 4.2 1.4 1.0 0.9 2.1 I.I ( l .4) (1.2 16.7 
E AL ) 13.7 16.4 10.8 5.0 7.5 2.0 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.3 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 l.O 0.3 -0.6 5.5 
F 
M3t 
9.6 8.9 2.5 5.2 -1.7 1.3 1.2 -0.6 -1.3 -1.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.4 --0.4 -0.9 -0.3 4.0 
IRL  5.0 15.4 3.1 9.0 23.3 8.5 12.6 4.1 5.2 2.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 --0.3 1.2 --0.3 -0.2 15.2 
I M2 9.9 8.1 9.1 4.5 7.8 1.8 2.7 2.3 1.5 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.1 -0.3 0.5 0.6 7.3 
NL M3 12.0 7.7 5.2 6.3 7.8 0.7 2.7 1.5 I.I 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 -0.2 1.8 7.8 p kiJ) 10.4 11.2 18.7 12.7 6.6 2.4 1.4 1.2 I. I 2.7 0.5 --0.1 1.5 0.8 0.3 ( -0 5) (0.5) (5.1) UK 18.8 12.0 5.8 3.5 5.8 0.7 1.1 0.9 I. I 2.5 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.8 6.2 
EUR 12(1 11.1 8.8 6.4 5.6 (6.6) 1.4 1.7 1.6 I.I 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 (0.6) (0.6) (6.2) 
USA ~M ~ 5.1 3.5 3.1 1.6 1.5 0.4 --0.4 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0. l 2.1 JAP M2 12.0 7.4 2.3 --0.2 2.2 -0.3 1.8 -0.1 0.9 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 0.1 -0.8 0.6 --0.3 0.8 
- II --
TABLE A.6: Short-term interest rates (m) 
1993 1994 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 over 12 
II Ill IV Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Febr. March months 
(c) 
B 8.7 9.8 9.4 9.4 8.2 8.5 7.4 8.8 8.1 6.5 10.0 9.2 8.1 7.2 7.0 6.5 6.2 -2.2 
DK 9.7 11.0 9.9 11.5 10.8 15.1 9.3 10.9 8.1 6.2 10.3 8.8 8.0 7.4 6.3 6.3 6.1 -8.4 
D 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.5 7.2 8.3 7.6 6.8 6.3 5.8 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.8 -2.l 
GR 18.7 19.9 22.7 23.5 23.5 26.0 21.8 23.8 22.3 25.0 27.9 19.2 19.9 19.5 19.9 -5.4 
E 15.0 15.2 13.2 13.3 11. 7 14.3 12.6 10.6 9.2 8.5 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.1 -6.5 
F 9.4 10.3 9.6 10.4 8.6 11.8 8.0 7.8 6.7 6.3 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 -5.0 
IRL 9.8 11.4 10.4 12.4 9.3 16.3 7.8 6.6 6.4 6.0 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.0 6.0 6.1 -4.8 
I 12.7 12.3 12.2 14.0 10.2 11.8 10.8 9.3 8.8 8.4 9.1 8.8 9.0 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.4 -2.9 
NL 7.4 8.7 9.3 9.4 6.9 7.9 7.1 6.4 6.0 5.3 6.4 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.2 5.3 5.3 -2.3 
p 14.9 16.9 17.7 16.2 12.2 10.9 10.8 10.0 10.6 10.6 10.9 11.0 10.7 9.8 9.6 
UK 13.9 14.8 11.5 9.6 59 6.4 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 --0.8 
EVR 12(nJ 10.6 11.4 10.8 II.I 8.5 ]0.2 8.6 7.9 7.2 6.6 7.7 7.5 7.2 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.6 -3.2 
USA 8.4 7.8 5.5 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.8 0.8 JAP 5.4 7.7 7.4 4.4 3.0 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 -1.0 
TABLE A. 7: Long-term interest rates (o) 
1993 1994 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 over 12 
II III IV Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Febr. March months (c) 
B 8.7 10.1 9.3 8.6 7.2 7.5 7.3 7.2 6.8 6.8 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.9 7.1 --0.3 
DK 10.2 11.0 JO.I JO.I 8.8 9.9 8.8 8.5 8.0 7.6 8.4 8.1 8.0 7.7 7.4 7.7 7.8 -1.8 
D 7.0 8.9 8.6 8.0 6.3 6.7 6.6 6.2 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.8 6.2 --0.2 
GR 7.8 E 13.7 14.7 12.4 12.2 10.2 12.0 11.0 9.3 8.3 8.1 8.9 8.5 8.3 8.1 7.9 8.6 -3.1 
F 8.8 9.9 9.0 8.6 6.8 7.6 7.1 6.4 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.4 6.7 --0. 7 
IRL 9.0 JO.I 9.2 9.1 7.7 9.0 7.9 7.4 6.7 7.0 7.2 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.6 --0.7 
I 12.9 13.4 13.0 13.7 11.3 13.2 12.5 10.3 9.3 9.2 9.7 9.1 9.6 9.2 8.8 9.0 9.7 -3.3 
L 7.7 8.6 8.2 7.9 6.9 7.3 7.1 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.4 --0.9 
NL 7.2 9.0 8.7 8.1 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.6 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.2 6.7 --0.2 
p 16.7 16.8 18.3 15.4 12.5 13.8 14.0 11.5 10.5 10.2 10.8 10.4 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.2 9.7 -3.5 
UK 9.6 I !.I 9.9 9.1 7.8 8.5 8.4 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.7 --0. 7 
EUR 12(n) 9.7 10.9 10.2 9.8 7.9 8.8 8.4 7.5 6.9 7.0 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.6 6.9 7.4 -1.1 
GSA 8.5 8.6 8.1 7.7 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.3 6.1 6.5 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.9 0.1 
JAP 5.2 7.5 6.7 5.3 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.0 0.0 
TABLE A.8: Value of ECU = ... units of national currency or SOR 
1993 1994 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 over 12 
II Ill IV Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Febr. March months 
(c) 
BFR/LFR 43.38 42.43 42.22 41.60 40.47 40.11 40.17 40.69 40.89 40.06 41.06 41.49 40.89 40.32 40.36 40.00 39.81 --0.4 
DKR 8.05 7.86 7.91 7.81 7.59 7.49 7.50 7.74 7.64 7.56 7.83 7.71 7.64 7.57 7.54 7.57 7.56 1.5 
DM 2.07 2.05 2.05 2.02 1.94 1.95 1.95 1.93 1.92 1.94 1.91 1.91 1.92 1.93 1.94 1.94 1.93 --0.5 
DR 178.8 201.3 225.2 246.8 268.4 261.9 265.7 270.0 276.1 280.0 273.8 276.3 275.0 277.0 278.8 280.1 281.2 6.9 
PTA 130.4 129.4 128.5 132.4 148.7 138.9 146.2 154.8 155.7 158.6 154.1 153.7 154.9 158.4 159.5 157.8 158.6 14.3 
FF 7.02 6.91 6.97 6.85 6.63 6.60 6.59 6.69 6.65 6.59 6.69 6.69 6.67 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.58 ---0.2 
IRL 0.777 0.768 0.768 0.761 0.799 0.779 0.801 0.814 0.804 0.787 0.821 0.8!1 0.804 0.796 0.778 0.787 0.795 --0.5 
LIT 1511 1522 1533 1592 1840 1839 1815 1823 1883 1896 1848 1863 1882 1906 1894 1885 1910 1.7 
HFL 2.34 2.31 2.31 2.28 2.18 2.19 2.19 2.17 2.15 2.17 2.15 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.17 --0.5 
ESC 173.4 181.1 178.7 174.7 188.0 177.6 183.8 194.3 196.8 196.9 196.1 197.1 196.4 197.1 196.2 196.0 198.6 10.7 
UKL 0.673 0.714 0.701 0.736 0.780 0.807 0.786 0.764 0.764 0.755 0.773 0.774 0.762 0.757 0.746 0.756 0.764 -5.4 
t.;SD 1.102 1.271 1.238 1.295 1.172 1.191 1.207 1.150 1.140 1.124 1.179 1.164 1.129 1.129 1.114 1.118 1.139 -3.3 
YEN 151.8 183.6 166.4 164.0 130.] 144.0 132.8 121.4 123.4 121.0 124.2 124.5 121.7 124.1 124.1 118.8 120.1 -12.9 
DTS 0.860 0.937 0.905 0.920 0.839 0.903 0.865 0.820 0.818 0.810 0.832 0.827 0.813 0.816 0.811 0.805 0.815 --4.6 
TABLE A.9: Effective exchange rates: export aspect(p) - Percentage change on preceding period 
1993 1994 1993 1994 Change 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 over 12 
II lll IV Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Febr. March months 
(c) 
B/L --0.9 5.2 --0.3 2.3 0.8 0.1 --0.6 -2.5 --0.5 1.7 0.1 -1.3 l.l 1.6 ---0.4 0.7 0.9 -1.2 
DK -2.7 7.6 -1.9 2.8 2.1 1.2 -0.8 --4.6 1.5 0.2 1.6 1.2 0.3 1.2 --0.4 ---0.8 0.7 -3.8 
D -1.3 5.7 -I.I 3.3 2.7 0.2 -1.0 --0.2 0.7 -2.0 2.1 0.1 -1.6 --0.6 -1.2 --0.4 1.2 -1.8 
GR -7.5 -8.0 11.5 7.7 -9.6 -2.6 -2.1 -3.1 -2.0 -1.8 ---0.5 -I.I 0.0 --0.5 -1.0 ---0.8 0.1 -8.1 
E 4.1 5.1 0.3 1.8 -13.l 0.1 -5.6 6.9 -0.4 -2.5 3.5 0.0 -1.5 -2.1 -I. I 0.8 0.1 -14.2 
F -1.3 6.1 -2.1 3.6 1.9 0.3 0.3 -3.1 0.8 0.5 1.9 ---0.2 -0.3 1.4 -0.4 --0.4 0.9 -1.6 
IRL -1.3 5.8 -1.3 2.8 -5.9 -5.2 -3.5 -3.3 1.3 1.4 0.6 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.6 -1.2 --0.3 -1.9 
I 0.4 3.7 2.0 -2.7 -16.9 -7.9 0.8 -2.1 -3.4 -1.4 ---0.4 -I.I -1.8 -1.2 0.2 0.2 ---0.8 -3.8 
NL -1.0 3.9 --0.7 2.4 3.0 0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.8 -1.5 l.7 0.1 -1.0 --0.3 --0.9 ---0.4 0.6 -1.0 p 3.2 1.3 0.6 3.6 7.6 -1.5 -3.7 -6.2 -1.3 --0.6 I.I --0.8 --0.2 ---0.2 0.0 ---0.1 --0.8 -10.8 
UK -3.4 --0.8 0.4 -3.6 -9.0 -1.8 2.3 1.2 0.1 0.4 --0.1 --0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 -1.7 0.4 3.7 
EUR 12 3.0 11.5 3.3 2.4 9.0 -3.6 -1.2 4.0 ---0.2 -1.9 3.2 --0. 7 -1.9 0.2 -I. I -1.2 1.2 -5.3 
USA 4.9 -6.2 0.7 2.3 4.5 3.5 -3.1 2.1 1.5 0.5 -1.3 I. I 1.7 0.6 0.5 -I.I --0.8 0.4 JAP --4.4 -10.2 8.6 5.0 20.8 5.1 9.1 6.5 -2.0 0.8 2.9 -1.0 0.4 -1.9 -1.0 4.6 0.1 12.5 
Sources. For Community countries: Eu_rostat. unles:i otherwise specified; for the USA and Japan: national sources. 
(a) Excluding construction. Data are adJusted for working days. 
(b) P~rcentage change over 12 months on the basis of the non-adjusted series of the most recent figure. 
(c) Difference of rates with respect to the corresponding month of the previous year. 
(d) Ab~olute value of change on corresponding month in previous year; seasonally adjusted. 
(e) Percentage change over 12 month:-. m the s.a. figure 
(I) Number of unemployed estimated by Eurostat on the basis of the results of Community labour force survey; annual average and quarterly average. 
(g) National source: quarterly and monthly figures of the Netherlands; USA and Japan; as% of the total labour force. 
(h) Monthly figures calculated by linear interpolation. 
(i) Before January 1991. West-Germany. 
U) The_deseasonali;:ed serie for EUR 12 is the result of a deseasonaliLation of the gross export and import figures of the Member States. 
(k) National sources for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom; seasonal adjustment by Eurostat for Greece, Ireland and Italy. 
(\) A ve:rage of monthly changes s.a. weighted by GDP at 1985 prices and purchasing power. Belgium: monthly figure obtained by linear interpolation of quarterly data. 
(m)Nat1onal sources; three-month interbank rate except: Belgium, up to end 1989, 3 month treasury certificates; Denmark, daily money market rate; Portugal: 3 month treasury. Annual, 
quarterly and monthly averages. 
(n) Weighted geometric mean. weights: gross domestic product at current prices and ECU. 
(o) Yield on public sector bonds. Portut_al starting from 1990 before tax. Annual and quarterly averages. Monthly average for Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, USA, end of month for t e other countries. 
(p) Weighting coefficients are calculated taking into account not only bilateral trade but also competition on third markets and on the domestic market of the exporting country. 
/\lotes (s.a.) = seasonally adjusted : --= data not available ( ) ~ estimated. 
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Principal economic policy measures - February 1994 
Community (EUR-12) 
14.2 Portugal's revised convergence programme for the period 1993-1997 was 
approved by the ECOFIN Council. 
Belgium (B) 
7.2 The central bank reduces its central rate from 6.85% to 6.70% and cuts the 
rate on advances within the ceiling from 8.35% to 8.20%. The rate on advances 
in excess of the ceiling and the discount rate are kept unchanged, at 11 % and 
5.25%. 
18.2 The central bank reduces its central rate from 6.70% to 6.55%, its 
discount rate from 5.25% to 5%, its rate on advances within the ceiling from 
8.20% to 8.05% and the rate on advances in excess of the ceiling from 11 % to 
10.50%. 
26.2 The central bank lowers its central rate from 6.55% to 6.4% and its rate on 
advances within the ceiling from 8.05% to 7.9%. The rate on advances in excess 
of the ceiling and the discount rate are kept unchanged, at 10.5% and 5%. 
Denmark (DK) 
17.2 The discount rate and the interest rate on banks' current accounts with the 
Nationalbank are lowered by 1/4% to 5 1/2%. 
Germany (D) 
17.2 With effect from 18 February, the Bundesbank cuts the discount rate to 
5.25% (from 5.75%) and leaves the Lombard rate unchanged at 6.75%. 
Greece (GR) 
14.2 The interest rate on one-year Treasury bills is reduced by 25 basis points to 
19.50%. 
22.2 The Governor of the Bank of Greece presents the monetary policy 
programme for 1994. The target for M3 growth is set at 8-11 %, that for credit 
expansion to the private sector at 11 % and that for total domestic credit 
expansion at 6-8%. 
28.2 The interest rates on three-month and twelve-month Treasury bills are 
reduced by 50 basis points, to 16.50% and 19% respectively. The interest rate on 
six-month Treasury bills is cut by JOO basis points to 18%. 
Spain (E) 
None. 
France (F) 
24.2 The Monetary Policy Council of the Banque de France cuts its 
intervention rate from 6.2% to 6.1 %. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
17.2 With effect from 18 February, the Bank of Italy announces that it is 
cutting the official discount rate from 8.0% to 7.5%. The fixed-term advance is 
cut by the same amount to 8.5%. 
Luxembourg (L) 
26.2 On a proposal from the Banque et Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat, the 
Government approves adjustments in a number of interest rates. As regards 
deposit rates, the interest rates on savings are to be reduced across the board by 
0.5 percentage point with effect from I March 1994. As regards lending rates, the 
interest rate on housing loans is also to fall by 0.5 percentage point with effect 
from the same date. 
Netherlands (NL) 
18.2 The Nederlandsche Bank cuts its rate on advances from 5.25% to 5%. The 
discount rate and the rate on special advances remain unchanged, at 5% and 
5.50%. 
18.2 The Government decides to ease the burden of taxes and social security 
contributions by some HFL 5 billion (on an annual basis) with effect from 1995. 
The breakdown will be as follows: 
- HFL 2 billion by lowering the composite rate (corresponding to income tax 
and social security contributions payable by individuals) in two stages: from 
38.25% to 38% on 1 July 1994 (HFL 600 million) and from 38% to 37.25% 
on I January 1995; 
- HFL 2 billion by reducing firms' labour costs with effect from 1 July 1994 
(reduction in the unemployment premium payable by firms to the 
unemployment fund). The Government will bear the cost of this measure; 
- the balance of some HFL I billion is accounted for, among other things, by an 
additional rental subsidy (HFL 850 million), a reduction in corporate taxes 
for small enterprises (HFL 175 million) and the abolition (in full or in part) of 
the tax on capital for new enterprises. 
The tax reliefs are possible because of the higher-than-expected level of tax 
receipts and are designed to stimulate the economy and employment. 
Portugal (P) 
3.2 The Government raises the minimum wage by 4%. 
14.2 The Bank of Portugal reduces its intervention rate for money-market 
operations by 1 /8th of a percentage point. It offers to inject ESC 200 billion of 
seven-day funds at 10.12% under sales and repurchase agreements. It also 
proposes to sell seven-day certificates carrying an interest rate of 9.125%. 
17.2 The Portuguese authorities merged two of the three telecommunications 
operators (Telefones de Lisboa e Oporto and Telecom Portugal) to form 
Portugal Telecom. The new operator is responsible for communications in 
Lisbon and Oporto as well as for calls with the rest of the country and with 
Europe. Marconi, the intercontinental operator, in which the State has a 51 % 
holding, is excluded from the merger for the time being. 
21.2 The Bank of Portugal lowers its intervention rate for money-market 
operations by 1 /8th of a percentage point. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
8.2 The Bank of England cuts its base rate by 0.25% to 5.2%. 
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